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This note adds to the existing literature by examining 
the enabling conditions for the creation of mandatory 
funded pension funds, and identifying additional factors 
that are important to consider in the early stages of the 
reform. The note stresses the importance of some factors 
that had already been identified in previous literature but 
not fully observed by reforming countries, including the 
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strong and lasting commitment of the authorities with 
the reform, the fiscal commitment with the reform, and 
some basic financial infrastructure. The analysis is also 
extended to analyze the role of supervision in the early 
stages of the reform and the role of the government in 
fostering the development of the domestic capital market. 
 
 












                                                 










Over the past decade the Word Bank has promoted pension reforms entailing 
the introduction of multi-pillar pension systems.  This approach to reform has 
many positive aspects but has not been exempt from problems.  Multi-pillar 
pension reforms typically included the introduction of a second pillar, in which 
mandatory savings are accumulated in individual accounts.  The new second pillars 
were expected to contribute to the primary objective of a more diversified and 
sustainable pension system and also contribute to secondary objectives, such as 
higher savings ratios, faster capital market development and improved growth 
performance.  A recent report by the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) of the 
World Bank
2 concludes that these secondary benefits have not materialized in some 
of the countries that have implemented these reforms.  The Board of Directors of the 
World Bank has called for a better understanding of the preconditions that should be 




Various World Bank documents have addressed the issue of preconditions for a 
successful second pillar.
4  The literature identifies the three basic sets of factors that 
need to be in place to enhance the prospects of a pension reform: macroeconomic 
stability, a sound financial infrastructure, and adequate regulatory and supervisory 
capacity.  The discussion on macroeconomic stability is usually focused on the need 
to maintain low inflation, so as to enable the development of long-term capital market 
instruments suitable for pension funds.  Regarding financial infrastructure, the 
literature concludes that the existence of a core number of sound banks and insurance 
companies is sufficient for the early stages of the reform.
5  These institutions would 
ensure the proper management of contributions, payments, and individual accounts, 
and the provision of custodial services.  They would also ensure the provision of life 
and disability insurance, in the cases where this type of insurance is shifted to the 
private sector.  Finally, the literature stresses the need for effective regulation and 
                                                 
2 World Bank (2005) 
3  Since the IRG paper was published, a number of reforming countries, including Argentina, Bolivia, El 
Salvador and Slovakia began policy discussions that may have consequences for the sustainability of their 
second pillars.  
4 See Vittas (1998), Vittas (1999), Impavido, Musalem and Vittas (2002), Glaessner and Valdes (1998), 
and Holzmann and Hinz (2005). 
5 Glaessner and Valdes (1998) conclude that this is the most important pre-condition in small countries. 
  2supervision, while also identifying the areas of regulation that are essential in the 
early phases, such as licensing.   
 
The general conclusion of the literature is that the preconditions for a second 
pillar are not very demanding, and that the gradual accumulation of pension 
assets provides the time for policy-makers to improve the institutional and 
regulatory environment during reform implementation.  While the literature 
identifies the main issues and provides reasonable policy recommendations overall, it 
does not examine the pre-conditions in sufficient detail, and does not exhaust the 
issues that policy-makers should take into consideration in the early phase of a 
reform.     
 
This note adds to the existing literature by examining the pre-conditions in more 
detail, and identifying additional factors which are important to take into 
consideration in the early stages of the reform.  The note also stresses the 
importance of some factors that had already been identified but not fully 
observed by reforming countries.  This note benefits from additional information 
accumulated from two sources since the first reforms.  First, the note benefits from a 
recent and in-depth analysis of the cases of Chile, Colombia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, 
Mexico, and Poland.
6  Second, the note also benefits from the intensive worldwide 
effort in recent years to develop regulatory and supervisory standards in the areas of 
accounting, auditing, payments, government debt markets, banking, insurance, and 
securities. 
 
This note identifies a set of pre-conditions that need to be met at the time of the 
reform and a roadmap for the first five years of reform implementation, containing 
policy actions that may contribute to an orderly development of the second pillar.   
While the note identifies specific elements that need to be in place at the start of the 
reform, it stresses the need to pursue an active and complementary capital market 
development agenda. 
 
The note concludes that the most important precondition for a new second pillar 
is a strong and lasting commitment of the authorities to the reform, reflected in 
institutional arrangements to oversee reform implementation. The success of a 
new second pillar requires not only strong political support at the time of the reform, 
but also constant monitoring of the reform during the implementation period, through 
the creation of a permanent committee or the appointment of a designated official.  
The committee or the official should have sufficient resources and authority to 
identify and implement the necessary regulatory changes and promote the 
development of market infrastructure that ensures the success of the second pillar.   
 
The fiscal consequences of a pension reform should be clearly identified and 
understood before the reform, and reforming governments should have a clear 
strategy for financing the transition to the new pension system.  While the optimal 
                                                 
6 Rocha (2005), Impavido and Rocha (2005), Rudolph and Rocha (2006), Rudolph, et. al (2006), World 
Bank (2006). 
  3financing strategy will depend on specific country conditions, in most cases it should 
include parametric reforms to the existing pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system, possibly 
combined with fiscal measures that ensure that the reform will not be primarily debt-
financed. Governments should not rely on a debt financing strategy, because of the 
negative consequences for the cost of debt financing, capital market development, 
and the diversification of pension fund portfolios. 
 
Some basic financial infrastructure needs to be present at the time of the reform.  The 
note identifies specific requirements in the areas of payments and security settlement 
systems, custody, and trading platforms. It also stresses the importance of accurate, 
transparent and enforced accounting, financial reporting and valuation systems that 
promote fair valuation of instruments and the need for independent and competent 
auditors to promote self regulation.  The note identifies a more rigorous set of 
preconditions for countries that decide to transfer disability and survivorship 
insurance to the second pillar, as in these cases it becomes necessary to have the 
whole regulatory and institutional framework for the payout phase in place at the start 
of the reform. 
 
Government institutions need to adjust their policies and strategies to support the 
pension reform. The government should build its capacity for managing public debt 
and be prepared to adopt a debt management strategy that meets the needs of 
institutional investors, establishes a benchmark for private issues, and promotes 
capital market development.  The supervisory agency should be prepared to handle 
the first challenges of the reform, including licensing and an early consolidation of 
the pension fund industry in the case of open pension funds. 
 
The document is structured into six sections, which are organized according to the 
type of preconditions that need to be met at the time of a pension reform. The second 
section addresses the need for commitment to the pension reform. The third section 
identifies the fiscal policies that must be in place at the time of the reform and during 
the period of implementation.  The fourth section deals with financial sector 
infrastructure and is divided into two subsections: the first deals with conditions that 
should be met at the time of the reform, and the second with conditions that should be 
met during the first five years of implementation.  The fifth section examines the 
regulatory and supervisory framework, and the last section concludes. 
 
 
COMMITMENT OF THE AUTHORITIES TO THE REFORM 
 
The most important precondition for a pension reform is a strong and lasting 
commitment of the authorities to maintain macroeconomic stability, to pursue a 
coherent and complementary capital market reform agenda, and to create an 
effective regulatory and supervisory agency.
7  Authorities need to be aware that 
                                                 
7 In the cases of Hungary and Slovakia, pension reforms were approved with tight majorities at their 
respective Parliaments. In both cases, the governments that followed the reforming government did not 
support the reform process.  Impavido and Rocha (2006) provide an analysis of the Hungarian case. 
  4pension reform is a continuous process and requires an ongoing commitment during 
the transition period.  Although initial conditions are an important element of a 
reform, successful reforms also require a continuous process of improvements in 
legislation, regulation, and capacity building that need to take place in the first years 
of implementation.  The lack of commitment to sound fiscal policies is one of the 
factors that have affected most reforms, leading to lower savings and undiversified 
pension portfolios.  This has been aggravated by lingering deficiencies in the 
financial infrastructure and capital market regulation that do not foster the 
development of new instruments suitable for pension funds, and that do not reduce 
the risks inherent in transactions among different parties.   
 
It is essential to have in place appropriate institutional arrangements, ensuring 
the government’s capacity to handle the developmental issues of a pension 
reform.  In many reforming countries the task forces or consultative groups that were 
formed during the period of preparation were dissolved during the period of 
implementation.  This led in many cases to an institutional vacuum and lack of 
capacity to identify problems and formulate solutions.  The appropriate arrangements 
could entail the creation of a permanent committee or a designated official to manage 
the reform process. This committee or official should have sufficient resources and 
authority to coordinate with the pension fund supervisor and other government 
agencies, including ministries of Finance, Justice, Labor and Social Security, the 
Central Bank, and banking, securities, and insurance supervisors.  For example, in the 
case of Chile, there has been a continuous follow-up of the reform through the Capital 
Markets Committee, coordinated by the Ministry of Finance and including all the 
supervisory agencies.  
 
 
FISCAL AND MACROECONOMIC STABILITY 
 
In most countries, the introduction of a second pillar entails the partial (or full) 
diversion of contributions from the public pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system to 
individual accounts in the second pillar.  In the absence of offsetting measures this 
results in larger deficits in the public PAYG system and in the general government.   
Governments need to continue paying benefits to current pensioners and older 
workers while suffering a loss of revenues related to the diversion of contributions to 
second pillar accounts. This transition deficit may increase over time, as the share of 
the labor force enrolled in the new system increases.  The transition period may last 
for 35-40 years.   
 
A critical issue in pension reform relates to the strategy adopted for financing 
the transition to the new system.  A tax-financed transition requires offsetting the 
fiscal losses caused by the introduction of the second pillar through tax increases or 
expenditure cuts (which may include parametric reforms to the PAYG system).  It 
burdens current taxpayers temporarily but could increase domestic savings and boost 
  5growth performance, benefiting all generations.
8  A debt-financed transition involves 
maintaining the balance of other taxes and expenditures constant and financing the 
fiscal losses caused by the second pillar through explicit debt issues.  National 
savings ratios may remain stable, but the explicit public debt increases and the burden 
of pension imbalances continues to be shifted to future generations.
9    
 
It is essential to have a sound strategy for financing the transition based on solid 
analytical tools.  Countries should not implement pension reform without a clear 
evaluation of the fiscal impact of the reform based on solid actuarial projections.  The 
optimal financing strategy depends on initial conditions, including the overall fiscal 
balance, the initial and projected financial situation of the PAYG system, the stock of 
explicit debt and the tax burden.  Governments that are already running large deficits 
should not initiate a second pillar, especially in cases where there are severe 
imbalances in the existing PAYG system contributing to the general deficit.  In these 
situations, the introduction of the second pillar can only be justified when it is part of 
a broader reform package including strong parametric reforms to the PAYG.   
 
Countries should not introduce a second pillar when the explicit government 
debt is not perceived as sustainable.  The sustainability of explicit government debt 
depends on the interest rate-output growth differential, the primary balance and the 
currency denomination.
10  These variables depend, in turn, on other fundamental 
factors such as savings and investment ratios, the depth of capital markets, the level 
and volatility of government revenues, the debt maturity structure, and the initial size 
of the debt to GDP ratio. Therefore, it is difficult to determine thresholds that would 
apply to all countries.  For example, the Maastricht agreement for EU countries 
entails a maximum ratio of government debt to GDP of 60 percent.  However, the 
evidence suggests that these ceilings are too high for most emerging economies, since 
half of all government defaults or restructurings since 1970 have taken place in 
countries with ratios of external debt to GDP below 60 percent.
11  Moody’s (2006) 
shows that investment grade countries have government debt to GDP ratios around 38 
- 43 percent.  This range probably captures more accurately the market perception of 
debt sustainability for most emerging countries, although the assessment of 
                                                 
8 Kotlikoff (1995 and 1996) simulates the impact of different financing strategies on growth and the 
welfare of different generations.  Kotlikoff, Smetters and Walliser (2001) provide further simulations of the 
impact of different types of taxes on the welfare of different generations.   
9 Under certain assumptions, savings ratios and the sum of the implicit pension debt and the explicit debt 
may remain stable as a share of GDP, but if the pre-reform situation entailed a bias against future 
generations this bias is maintained.   
10  IMF (2003) and Celasun, Debrun and Ostry (2006) propose a sustainability condition that depends on 
the interest rate-output growth differential and a parameter of the government’s reaction function.  For the 
case of emerging economies, Hausmann (2003) and Hausmann and Velasco (2005) argue that 
governments’ inability to borrow at long maturities and fixed rates in domestic currency forces them to opt 
for hard currency or short-term domestic currency debt, which makes debt service sensitive to interest rate 
and real exchange rate shocks. Consequently, the sustainability of public debt is also affected by its 
currency denomination.    
11 Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003). 
  6sustainability would still need to be country-specific.
12  Van Wijnbergen (2007) 
suggests that backward looking indicators (such as current levels of debt) need to be 
complemented by a forward looking fiscal sustainability assessment that takes into 
account the risks the country faces, including the risk of sudden interruptions in 
financing flows.   
 
Stylized simulations of pension reform indicate that for most countries the 
optimal financing strategy is probably a mixed one.  It may involve an element of 
debt finance in the early stages of the transition but should evolve progressively 
towards more tax finance during implementation.
13  Debt-financed transitions 
have at best a neutral impact on national savings, and may have a negative impact if 
the interest rate on explicit debt is higher than the implicit interest rate on the implicit 
pension debt.  This may be the case when the debt ratio is already high and the 
government is already paying a risk premium.
14  Excessive debt finance will also 
hinder the development of the capital market and affect the capacity of pension funds 
to diversify portfolios.  
 
Some reforming countries have failed to maintain fiscal discipline during the period 
of implementation and have relied excessively on debt finance.  In these countries 
savings ratios have declined, pension portfolios have remained undiversified, and the 
impact of the reform on capital market development has been modest.  For example, 
in Colombia, Hungary, and Poland, fiscal deficits increased above and beyond the 
revenue losses to the second pillar.  In all these countries savings ratios declined and 
pension portfolio have remained undiversified, consisting largely of government 
bonds.  Although the fiscal situation has recently improved the transition has still 
been primarily debt-financed.
15  By contrast, in Chile, the fiscal adjustment 
implemented at the start of the reform contributed to the increase in national savings, 
and enabled pension funds to diversify portfolios and finance the private sector 
already in the early stages of the transition. The factors probably contributed to 
Chile’s impressive growth performance in this period.
16   
 
On the other extreme, some reforming countries with large fiscal surpluses and 
national savings, driven by massive foreign exchange inflows, have experienced very 
poor returns on second pillar assets.   There are reforming countries such as 
Kazakhstan that are commodity exporters and have experienced a prolonged boom in 
                                                 
12 Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003), Oviedo (2006), and Mendoza and Oviedo (2003) examine the 
role of macroeconomic fundamentals in debt sustainability.  Note that the assessment of sustainability can 
be complicated further by the possibility of multiple equilibria related to different market perceptions (see 
Calvo (1988), Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996) and Palley (2004).  
13 Kotlikoff  (1995 and 1996) shows that a mixed financing strategy increases savings and growth in the 
transition to the new steady-state, while also contributing to an improved intergenerational burden sharing. 
Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel (2003) show that Chile’s high growth rates after the reform were due in part to 
a tax-financed transition.  Kotlikoff (1996) shows that capital accumulation may reduce interest rates and 
reduce the cost of debt service, but this would be difficult to achieve in a pure debt-financed transition.   
14 The risk premium could increase further if the market does not treat implicit and explicit debt 
equivalently.  The impact of the swap of implicit for explicit debt on the risk premium has not been tested.  
15 Rudolph et al (2006), Impavido and Rocha (2006), and Rudolph and Rocha (2007). 
16 Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel (2003), Chile Pensions Commission (2006). 
  7commodity prices (e.g. oil).  This situation led to large fiscal surpluses, eliminated the 
need for debt issues and hindered the development of a benchmark yield curve.  
Moreover, private issuers have not issued instruments because of abundant access to 
cheap capital from domestic banks and abroad.  Pension funds have been forced to 
invest primarily in foreign assets due to the lack of domestic instruments, and have 
earned earn negative returns in domestic currency due to the currency appreciation.
17   
 
The analysis of actual reform cases supports the view that the optimal financing 
strategy for most emerging countries is a mixed one.  Most countries have initiated 
reforms with fiscal deficits of around 3 percent of GDP or higher, savings ratios 
around 20 percent of GDP or lower, and debt ratios above 30 percent of GDP.  In 
these cases, a mixed strategy with a strong tax component would have produced more 
positive outcomes on savings, portfolio diversification, and capital market 
development, possibly contributing to a better growth performance.  At the same 
time, the analysis of actual reform cases also shows that commodity exporters would 
need to reevaluate the appropriateness of introducing a second pillar, as in these cases 
the implicit returns on a balanced PAYG system may be higher than the returns on a 
funded scheme.





This section addresses financial sector pre-conditions for a pension reform, and is 
divided into two parts.  The first part identifies the preconditions that need to be in 
place at the time of the reform, while the second part provides a roadmap for further 
institutional and regulatory improvements that should be introduced within the first 
five years of reform implementation.  Moreover, the preconditions at the initial stage 
are divided in those that are essential and those that are highly desirable.   The 
preconditions classified as highly desirable at the start of the reform become essential 
within a period of five years.  The analysis assumes that an important part of the 








It is essential to ensure the existence of rule of law and the provision of a basic 
legal framework to the protection of citizens against the arbitrary use of state 
                                                 
17 See World Bank (2006). 
18  Under these conditions the economy has excessive savings and is dynamically inefficient (see, e.g. 
Feldstein (1995)).  The authors are unaware of theoretical research examining how countries can meet debt 
solvency conditions and the dynamic efficiency condition simultaneously. 
19 Most of the preconditions are not necessary in the case that pension assets are fully invested in foreign 
securities through foreign platforms.  The main challenge in this case are in the legal framework, payment 
system and the provision of currency hedges (foreign exchange derivatives may not be available at 
reasonable prices and maturities).  
  8authority and lawless acts of organizations and individuals.  Laws properly 
adopted by a country must be applied, interpreted and enforced by an independent 
judiciary.  The existence of a basic and coherent group of laws builds the confidence 
of the population and investors in a market economy, and reduces the perceived risk 
of conducting transactions.  The basic legal framework includes commercial law, 
banking law, securities law, and other laws and regulations that address the issues of 
contractual relations, property rights, and creditor rights, including proper collateral 
and insolvency regimes.  Corruption is an important element to consider, as it may 






It is essential to have a core number of solvent banks able to provide an 
adequate infrastructure for large value and retail payments.   A group of solvent 
and well managed banks may allow pensions funds administrators to make payments 
and collect contributions with confidence. The presence of foreign banks may 
contribute to the faster absorption of adequate technology and management capacity. 
At the initial stages of the reform, large value transactions may be done through 
checks or money orders, but as the amounts increase, the risks and costs of check-
based systems become too onerous and it becomes necessary to move to more 
efficient systems.  
 
It is essential to have an IT system able to process and conciliate the flows of 
funds and the flows of information.  One of the major problems in the initial stages 
of the pension system is the integration and conciliation of the flow of data with the 
flow of resources.  Depending on whether the collection of contributions is 
centralized or not, the needs for centralization of information could be different.  
Many reforming countries faced payments problems in the initial stages, and had to 
make great efforts to remedy these problems. The system should be able to identify 
contributors, pensioners and employers.  In some cases it may require to issue social 
security cards or another form of personal identification in order to carry a 
personified reporting system and facilitate the submission of information by the 
employers.   
 
It is desirable to have an automated clearinghouse as a mechanism for 
centralizing the flow of data and integrating it with payments.  The centralization 
of the flow of data and the creation of an automated clearinghouse may enhance the 
efficiency of the payments system, generating economies of scale and relieve the 
burden on employers.  Automated clearinghouses have the advantage of being able to 
process payments timely and efficiently at lower cost while reducing operational 
risks. 
 
  9It is desirable to build a safe and efficient large value payment system based on 
legislation that adheres to best international principles and practices.
20  Due to 
their transactions with financial instruments, pension fund administrators are expected 
to become important users of the large value payment system. Failures or lack of 
standards in this area may jeopardize the security of the pension funds.  In this 
context it becomes necessary to introduce laws and regulations on payments such as 
rules on electronic signature and documents, validation of netting, and settlement 
finality. The agenda should also include standards and procedures agreed by the 
participants such as codes and hours of operation.   
 
It is desirable to introduce arrangements for medium and large companies to 
pay contributions electronically.  There are different models for reporting 
information, including manually filled forms, printouts from official software and 
electronic data transfers (either through software or online). The operational risks and 
costs associated with manual transactions are high and there should be efforts to 
introduce an electronic system. Electronic reporting may substantially reduce the 
administrative costs and operational risks of the pension system. For example, in the 
case of Poland, companies with more than 5 workers must conduct their transactions 
in electronic form, leading more than 90 percent of the transactions to be conducted 
electronically.   
 
 
Securities Settlement System 
 
It is essential to implement a plan of convergence to Delivery versus Payment 
(DvP).  The soundness and safety of the settlement system are paramount for all 
financial institutions, investors, and issuers.  The clearance and settlement process 
includes capturing trade information, trade matching, confirming and affirming 
institutional investor’s trades, clearing and settlement. The major settlement risk is 
counterparty risk (credit/principal risk). DvP is one of the primary means by which a 
market can reduce the risk inherent in securities transactions. The DvP concept seeks 
to eliminate counterparty risk from securities transactions by ensuring that sellers 
give up their securities if, and only if, they receive full payment and vice versa. 
 
It is desirable to have a reliable settlement system for processing trades, that is 
cost effective and convenient for its participants, and a solid legal framework 
that supports the implementation of DvP.  It would be useful to have a prompt and 
effective trade processing system that operates with a short elapsed time between 
trade date and settlement date, to increase the confidence of market participants in the 
capital market.  It is desirable that domestic systems use internationally recognized 
securities identification numbering standards. The legal framework that support DvP 
should contemplate enforceability of transactions, protection of customer assets 
(particularly against insolvency of custodians), immobilization or dematerialization of 
securities, netting arrangements, securities lending (including repurchase 
                                                 
20 BIS (2001). 
  10agreements), finality of settlement, default rules, prompt liquidation of assets pledged 
or transferred as collateral, and protection of the interests of beneficial owners. 
 
 
Exchange or Electronic Trading Platform 
 
It is desirable to have an efficient trading platform on which pension funds can 
trade their assets. This might take the form of an exchange or electronic trading 
platform.  These arrangements are even more important in systems based on 
open funds, where member can switch across funds.   Open pension funds should 
only be allowed to operate through secure platforms that guarantee market prices in 
all secondary market transactions. This condition applies especially to securities other 
than short-term CDs and government bills. Stock exchanges and electronic platforms 
with high levels of transparency provide the necessary financial infrastructure for 
pension funds to operate, in terms of anonymity of counterparts and price clearing.  
Some OTC markets have advanced in transparency, but are still far from ensuring 
efficient price clearing.   
 
 
Custodian and Depository Institutions 
 
It is essential to have an independent depository institution that enables book 
entry transfer of financial instruments. The depositary holds the titles of securities 
and allows only authorized individuals to transfer the property of the instruments. The 
depositary institution reduces operational risks and the risks of fraud in cases of 
stolen documents.  The depository could be an independent private institution or 
could be managed by the government or the Central Bank.
21  In the case of a privately 
owned institution, governance arrangements should be well articulated and fully 
transparent. Governance arrangements should minimize the conflicts between the 
objectives of owners, users, and other interested parties, and as far as possible resolve 
any remaining conflicts. Broadest industry participation should be promoted and 
membership standards for system operators should be established in order to 
minimize risk.  For example, in the case of Chile, in the first 12 years of the reform, 
securities were deposited at the Central Bank until the creation of a private central 
depository system (DCV) with broad participation of all financial institutions. 
 
It is essential that pension fund managers and custodians employ accounting 
practices and safekeeping procedures that fully protect the assets of the pension 
fund, particularly against the creditors of pension fund managers.  Custody risk 
is the risk of a loss on securities held in custody originated as a consequence of a 
pension fund manager’s insolvency, negligence, fraud, poor administration or 
inadequate record keeping.  Laws and regulations should ensure that the custodian 
employs procedures ensuring that all pension fund assets are appropriately accounted 
                                                 
21 The private institution could be foreign, but in this case it should be subject to national regulation.  An 
exception may apply to cases where it operates under common market arrangements such as the EU. 
  11for and kept safe.  Pension fund assets also must be protected against the claims of the 
pension fund manager creditors or other custodians that the law may authorize.  
 
 
Accounting, Auditing and Valuation  
 
It is essential to have a set of independent external auditors with the capacity to 
provide a professional opinion on the financial statements of pension funds and 
pension fund managers.  External auditors play an important role in certifying to 
contributors and other stakeholders that the information provided in the financial 
statements is correct.  This requires technical competence, professionalism and 
independence of external auditors. It is necessary to have a minimum set of principles 
and guidelines ensuring that external auditors independent and professional in the 
exercise of their duties.   As the reform is implemented it may be desirable to expand 
the scope of external audits to include assessments of the quality of risk management 
systems and internal controls (see section 4.2). 
 
It is essential that pension fund portfolios are valued on a mark-to-market basis 
in a context of accurate, transparent and enforced systems of accounting and 
financial reporting. Regular reports should be made public and external auditors 
should provide their professional opinion about the fairness of the financial accounts 
in representing the value of the pension assets.  Mark-to-market valuation allows 
contributors to monitor the value of their pension funds on a regular basis and to 
compare the return performance of different pension fund managers.  Mark-to-market 
valuation is critical in systems based on open pension funds, where contributors can 
switch across pension funds (voting with their feet).  The lack of accurate valuation 
implies non-transparent and unintended transfers of income across pension fund 
members.   
 
It is essential to have at least one independent provider of data on asset prices to 
value the portfolios of pension funds on a regular basis.  Efficient asset valuation 
is one of the critical elements for the soundness of a second pillar based on open 
pension funds.  Manipulation of price data may be very damaging to the health of the 
second pillar, as it may lead pension fund managers to make misguided buying and 
selling decisions and contributors to make wrong selection decisions as well (moving 
funds to another fund manager based on distorted information).  It is essential to have 
at least an independent price provider that could be private or public.
22  The provider 
should be prepared to value all the assets of a pension fund on a regular basis, 
preferably daily.  The price vector should take into consideration a high percentage of 
market transactions.   
 
It is desirable to start the process of convergence of local accounting standards 
to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), to avoid 
misinterpretation and confusion about the value of the funds. Local accounting 
                                                 
22 There are good experiences in many countries.  In the case of Chile, the price vector is provided by the 
pension supervisor and in Colombia, by a private price vendor.  
  12standards should be broadly similar to international standards at the start of the 
reform, and there should be an effort to migrate towards IFRS during the first years of 
implementation.  In order to ensure effective implementation of the standards, it is 
important that convergence to IFRS may include appropriate training and certification 
of accountants.  The most frequent sources of ambiguity, misunderstanding and 
misrepresentation are the following: (i) consolidation of subsidiaries accounts; (ii) 
related party transactions; (iii) contingent liabilities; (iv) unrealized gains and losses 




Preparation for the Payout Phase 
 
It is essential to ensure a sound framework for the payout phase in the countries 
that decide to shift disability and survivorship insurance (DSI) to the second 
pillar. Institutions and retirement instruments should be fully operative. If DSI is 
provided by the second pillar at the start of the reform, it is essential to have a core 
number of solvent insurance companies with the capacity to provide this insurance. 
The government must also ensure the existence of a sound regulatory framework for 
retirement products (annuities, phased withdrawals) and providers (life insurance 
companies, pension fund managers). It is essential to provide adequate consumer 
protection, by enhancing the transparency of these markets and defining key 
parameters such as discount rates and mortality tables.  In the cases where DSI 
remains in the first pillar, these actions could take place more gradually.  The 
international experience in this area is mixed.  Many Latin American countries (e.g., 
Chile, Argentina, and Colombia) have moved DSI to the second pillar, whereas 
Central European countries (e.g., Hungary and Poland) have decided to maintain it in 
the first pillar.     
 
 
Availability of Financial Instruments 
 
It is expected that in the initial stages of the system, the bulk of the portfolio of 
pension funds will be comprised by bank deposits, CDs, and government bonds.  
This has been the case in most reforming countries.  Therefore it is necessary to 
ensure that these markets work appropriately in the initial stages of the reform.  
Moreover, there is symbiotic relationship between the public debt market and the 
young pension fund sector that should be exploited up to an optimal level. 
 
 
Bank Deposits and CDs 
 
It is essential to have a core number of sound banks, in order to ensure the 
availability of basic and sound instruments in the early stages of the reform.  
This requires the existence of a group of well managed and capitalized banks subject 
to a sound regulatory and supervisory framework.  The presence of foreign banks, 
  13with headquarters in countries with consolidated supervision, may help bring high 





It is essential to start the reform with a well articulated strategy of public debt 
management.  The government should have a strategy for the development of the 
government debt market, including the development of a yield curve that provides the 
necessary benchmark for private instruments, including mortgage-related securities 
(mortgage bonds, mortgage-backed securities) and corporate bonds. The strategy 
should not be guided by the single objective of minimizing short-run financing costs, 
but should also take into account developmental objectives.  The government should 
enhance communications with all investors, including pension funds and insurance 
companies, and take into account the needs of these investors in the formulation of its 
debt management strategy.   
 
It is essential to ensure that government securities are sold and traded at market 
prices. The government should move away from funding below market rates with 
captive sources of funding and commit to fund at market rates.  Market rates could be 
reached through different systems such as auctioning, underwriting, syndication, or 
tap selling.  The optimal system would depend on the characteristics of the country 
and the depth of the capital market.  Some countries allow pension funds to 
participate directly in the auctions, while in other cases they have to buy bonds 
through dealers at the secondary market.  Both systems can operate equally well.   
 
It is desirable that the government moves towards dematerialized securities.  
Dematerialized securities reduce a number of operational risks and facilitate trading. 
The issuance of dematerialized instruments usually requires laws on electronic 
signature and documents, and the development of a platform for selling the bonds at 
the market. The investment is relatively small compared to the benefits that 
dematerialized instruments may bring to the market, including the setting of the 
benchmark for the rest of fixed income instruments issued at the market. Appropriate 
standardization of instruments as bullet coupon bonds may help to give liquidity to 
the benchmarks set by the government. 
 
It is highly desirable to introduce a clear organizational structure inside the Debt 
Management Office.  The Debt Management Office or the institution in charge of 
the government debt management should have the back, middle and front office 
functions clearly defined. This would avoid conflicts of interest and ensure 
appropriate checks and balances.  
 
 
Additional Conditions that Should Be Met within the First Five Years of 
Implementation 
 




It is essential to put in place a proper regulatory framework for transactions 
with foreign jurisdictions.   After the first few years of the reform, it is expected that 
pension funds will begin investing in foreign securities.  Procedures, rules and 
standards for operating with multicurrency instruments and transactions with foreign 
jurisdictions should be in place. 
 
 
Accounting, Auditing, and Valuation 
 
In countries that have introduced second pillars based on open pension funds it 
is essential to introduce a single methodology for asset valuation. As the market 
becomes more sophisticated, it is necessary to introduce a single methodology of 
valuation and a single asset price vector for valuation of portfolios at each point in 
time.  This would avoid manipulation of portfolio values and rates of return by 
pension fund managers, designed to induce switching into the fund.     
 
In some countries it may be desirable to expand the scope of audits to include 
assessments of the quality of internal risk management systems and internal 
controls.   The exposure of pension funds to operational and financial risks will tend 
to increase as the scale of operations increases and portfolios become more 
diversified.  In some countries the expansion of the system may outpace the build up 
of supervisory capacity.  In countries where the supervisor still lacks the capacity to 
assess the quality of risk management systems, it may be desirable to expand the 





It is essential to have at least one professional rating agency operating in the 
country. The investment regime for pension funds should encourage the use of 
ratings for eligible fixed income instruments.  Rating agencies provide an 
independent opinion about the risk of fixed income instruments and therefore may 
contribute to more efficient pricing of these instruments and faster market 
development.  The fixed income portfolio of pension funds should be composed to a 
large extent by rated instruments.  The regulatory framework should include 
minimum requirements of independence and professionalism on domestic rating 
agencies.   
 
 
Preparation for the Payout Phase 
 
  15It is essential for the countries that decide to maintain DSI in the first pillar to 
elaborate the regulatory framework for the payout phase, in order to ensure that 
the payout system is operational when the first contributors begin retiring.  
Although these countries may have a grace period of a few years to finalize the 
payout phase, the market needs to know in advance the retirement’s products that are 
going to be offered, life insurance companies need to start accommodating their 
portfolios, and the Government Debt Management Office needs to start giving more 
emphasis to the issuance of long term inflation indexed instruments.  
 
 
Availability of Financial Instruments 
 
Mortgage-Backed Securities and Asset-Backed Securities 
 
It would be essential to have in place a solid regulatory framework for 
securitization, providing the basis for the development of mortgage-backed 
securities and asset-backed securities.  Mortgage bonds and mortgage-backed 
securities (MBS) are relatively simple instruments, with relatively long duration and 
low risk. MBSs should be one of the first instruments through which pension funds 
begin to diversify their portfolios.  Pension funds and other institutional investors 
may contribute to the development of this market, by contributing to increased 
liquidity, transparency, and price efficiency.  Their participation may generate 
positive spillover effects, by allowing the banks and other loan originators to manage 
better their risks and liquidity, and ultimately contributing to improved access to 
housing finance and improved affordability.  However, pension funds and other 
institutional investors will participate in this market only if a number of elements are 
present, including an adequate legal, tax and accounting framework for securitization 
and secure bond issuance, facilities for lien registration, ability to enforce liens, 
ability to transfer (assign) security interest, and protection of investors against 
bankruptcy of originator or service.
23   
 
 
Equity and Corporate Bonds 
 
It would be essential to have in place a corporate law and securities law that 
protect the interests of stakeholders, including minority shareholders, as well as 
a market friendly tax regime.  It is expected that pension funds will start investing 
in equity and corporate bonds within the first five years of reform implementation.  
The governance of issuing companies, registering requirements for equity, and 
issuance requirements for corporate bonds, are elements that need to be properly 
addressed in the regulatory framework.  Proper minority shareholder protection rules 
would reduce the risks for pension funds (and other institutional investors) to invest 
in these instruments and promote market development.  The law should promote an 
active participation of pension funds as minority shareholders of companies, through 
their participation at the Assemblies of shareholders and in the appointment of 
                                                 
23  See Chiquier, Hassler and Lea (2004). 
  16directors of the companies. A non discriminatory and market friendly tax regime 
should be in place. 
 
 
Private Equity Funds  
 
It would be essential to have in place a regulatory framework, including tax 
treatment, that facilitates the creation of general/limited partnerships.  This 
format may provide the basis for the development of the private equity and venture 
capital industries. In some countries, these arrangements may be done through private 
contracts but in others a regulation should be in place that clarifies the rights ands 
responsibilities of each of the parties.  It is desirable to standardize the main 





It would be essential to have available simple foreign exchange instruments and 
derivatives. As pension funds invest part of their portfolio abroad, they will 
increasingly need to hedge their currency positions.  For this reason, it would be 
essential to develop simple derivatives such as currency forwards and swaps.  The 
existence of capital controls may create distortions in the value of these instruments.  
Access to theses instruments is even more critical for pension funds operating in 





THE REGULATORY AND SUPERVISORY FRAMEWORK 
 
A competent pension supervisor, properly staffed and enjoying a reasonable 
degree of legal and operational independence needs to be in place at the start of 
the reform.  It is not necessary to have a separate agency to supervise the pension 
sector.  Pension supervision could be part of a broader integrated supervisory agency.  
This is the case of many developed and emerging countries that have second pillars 
today, such as Australia, Colombia, Denmark, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland, 
Slovakia, and Sweden.  Countries that decide to maintain a separate agency will need 
to ensure proper coordination channels with other supervisors, including proper 
sharing of information.  This is essential for open pension systems, where pension 
funds are usually part of a financial conglomerate.   
 
It is essential to ensure that the supervisory agency has the capacity to deal with 
the early challenges posed by the new system, including licensing and rapid 
consolidation of the market in the case of open pension funds.  The supervisory 
agency should have the capacity to screen applicants and grant licenses only to 
qualified managers.  There are a number of management companies with international 
  17experience and high standards of operation that may contribute to the development of 
the second pillar.  There should be no legal or political restrictions to the entry of 
these companies.  In the early phases of implementation the supervisor must be able 
to assess the strengths and weaknesses of each financial group and the complex 
structures of financial conglomerates.  In the case of open pension funds, 
consolidation of the market usually takes place in the first years of the reform and 
supervisors should be able to handle unfair market practices for recruiting 
contributors.  The experience of other reforming countries shows that massive 
resources are spent in this phase (including the use of the sales force of related 
companies at subsidized prices) and consequences might be difficult to reverse. 
 
It is essential to provide adequate resources for training and capacity building 
by the supervisory agency in the early stages of the system.  The pension 
supervisory agency will need to build up capacity quickly, along with the growth of 
the industry and the sophistication of market players.  The supervisory agency may 
need to address complex issues such as excessive fees that have affected some 
reforming countries or cross selling of pension products with banking or insurance 
products.  If the supervisory agency lags behind the industry, pension fund managers 





The most important precondition for a pension reform is a strong and lasting 
commitment of the authorities to the reform. This requires, for the whole period of 
transition, the permanent monitoring of the reform by a permanent committee or a 
designated official.  Improvements in market infrastructure and enhancements in legal 
framework also need to take place in the first years of the reform in order to ensure 
better returns with lower risks.  
 
Solid analytical tools should be used to project the fiscal impact of the pension 
reform, and mechanisms of financing should be also defined ex ante. 
Governments should avoid relying excessively on debt financing of the transition, 
because of the adverse consequences on the cost of financing and capital market 
development. 
 
Some basic financial infrastructure needs to be in place at the start of the 
reform.  A basic legal framework and a functional court system are needed to 
provide the basic foundations for a financial sector. A core group of solvent and well 
managed banks is needed in the early stages of the system providing the necessary 
payments infrastructure, as well basic instruments.  Some institutions need to be 
present to support asset transactions, including exchanges or electronic trading 
platforms, and depository institutions, since all the transactions should be conducted 
through these markets.  An appropriate set of accounting rules, auditors and 
independent providers of asset prices are necessary for ensuring fair valuation, 
transparency, comparability, and appropriate monitoring of pension funds.  An 
  18additional and more demanding set of preconditions must be met in the countries that 
decide to shift disability and survivorship insurance to the second pillar.   
 
Government institutions need to be prepared to react appropriately to the 
pension reform.  The government must be prepared to design and implement a clear 
debt management strategy that takes into consideration the evolution of the investor 
base (pension funds and insurance companies) and the objective of capital market 
development.  The supervisory agency should be prepared to handle the first 
challenges of the reform: licensing and consolidation of the market in the case of 
open pension funds.  Finally, resources should be made available to the pension 
supervisory agency for training and capacity building. 
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 ANNEX 1 
 
Area t+0  t+5 
  Essential  Highly Desirable (Most essential in t + 5)  Essential 
1. Institutional 
arrangements designed to 
monitor reform 
implementation 
Permanent committee or designated authority     
 
Analytical tool to evaluate fiscal impact of the 
reform 
  
Avoid excessive reliance on debt financing of 
the transition.  Move towards tax-finance 
during implementation 
  
2. Fiscal sustainability 
Exceptional cases involving Dutch disease 
type of situations should re-evaluate the 
introduction of second pillar  
  
3. Financial Sector Infrastructure 
Rule of Law       3.1 Legal Framework 
Basic set of laws: Commercial Law, Securities 
Law and other laws and regulations that 
address efficiently the issues of collateral and 
insolvency, contractual relations between 
parties, creditor rights and property rights. 
  
  3.2 Institutional Framework    
A core of solvent banks with infrastructure to 
process retail and large value payments. 
A Large Value Payment system that may be 
in accordance to international principles. 
Laws, regulations and procedures that have 
specific applicability to payment system. 
An oversight system (Central Bank). 
Legal issues associated to 
multiple currencies and foreign 
jurisdictions. 
 An IT system for pension funds able to 
process and conciliate flows of contributions 
and information.  The system should be able 
to identify contributors, pensioners and 
employers. 
An Automated Clearinghouse (ACH) for 
retail payment system 
 
a. Payment System 
  Incentives for electronic payment of 
contributions by large and medium size 
companies 
 
b. Securities Settlement  Initiation of implementation of a plan aimed at  A prompt a reliable system for processing   
  23System  achieving final and irrevocable DvP and 
having an efficient settlement process. 
trades and a solid legal framework to 
support DvP 
c. Exchange or Electronic 
Trading Platforms 
 Exchange  or  electronic trading platforms. 
All transactions in the secondary market 
should take place through formal 
exchanges. 
 
Existence of an independent depository 
institution. It can be public or private. 
   d. Custodian and 
Depository Institution 
Custody should employ accounting practices 
and safekeeping procedures that fully protect 
customer’s securities. 
  
Mark-to-market valuation.  Convergence to IFRS  Independent rating agencies 
should rate fixed income 
instruments. 
Financial statements should be audited by 
external auditors. 
  
e. Accounting, Auditing, 
Valuation  and Rating 
At least one independent provider of 
information on asset prices, to be used for the 
valuation of pension fund portfolios.  The 
provider could be a private or public 
institution. 
  
g. Preparation for the 
Payout Phase   
Full legislation, regulation and institutional 
design of the payout phase if insurance of 
disability and survivorship is offered in the 
second pillar.  
.  Full legislation, regulation and 
institutional design of the payout 
phase if insurance of disability 
and survivorship is offered in the 
first pillar.  
  3.3 Availability of Financial Instruments    
a. Bank Deposits and CDs  
 
Core set of sound banks     
Government needs to develop a medium-term 
debt management strategy that includes 
commitment to finance through the market.  
 
The Debt Management Office should maintain 
open lines of communication with the market, 
getting inputs from pension funds, insurance 
companies, and other investors for the 





Internal management at the Debt 
Management Office: back, middle and front 
office functions should be clearly defined  
  b. Government Bonds 
  Dematerialization and standardization of 
debt instruments. 
Progress in building a yield curve. 
  24  25
c. Mortgage backed 
Securities and Asset 
backed Securities 
    Adequate legal, tax and 
accounting framework for loan 
securitization and secure bond 
issuance and other related to liens 
and customer protection. 
d. Equity and. Corporate 
Bonds 
    Commercial Code, Corporate, and 
Securities Law, providing solid 
governance structures, minority 
shareholder protection.   Market 
friendly corporate tax system. 
e. Private Equity Funds      Laws and regulation about 
Limited /General partnership 
structures 
f. Currency Instruments      Financial integration.  
Introduction of regulation 
allowing basic instruments for 
hedging currency risk.  
4. Regulatory and Supervisory Framework of Pension Funds     
  Supervisor well resourced and enjoying 
operational autonomy. Needs to be prepared 
to face licensing and early market 
consolidation  
Coordination among regulators, if 
supervision is not part of integrated agency. 
 
 